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Propaganda and International Relations: an Outlook in Wartime

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Abstract: The article is a little research, carried out in the seminars of International Relations of the PhD program in History, Studies of Security and Defense. The aim of the work is to highlight the role of propaganda during the conflicts in the contemporary age, particularly during the two World Wars. The propaganda developed during two major conflicts of the '900 as a true 'weapon' and instrument of government policy in international relations, has perfected the techniques of 'news management', and today is a real and relished 'art' applied to guide public opinion in favor of government decisions.

Keywords: Propaganda, War, Public Opinion, International Relations, First World War, Second World War.

1. Introduction

The propaganda has been widely used in contemporary times, both to obtain and consolidate consensus within the country, and as an instrument to regulate international relations, especially in war. Born as a modern technique in France of Napoleon, propaganda is a tool in the service of politics, which knew a climax during the Second World War, to be later used widely and successfully in the Gulf War. Today propaganda, halfway between science and art, has to be used by governments - even by China - to support their positions in the international arena in order to guide public opinion and build consensus (or confusing: counter-propaganda); e recent example is the story of Ukraine.

In recent days the term 'propaganda' has also been used as 'soft power' in changing and influencing social and public opinion through relatively less transparent channels and lobbying through powerful political and non-political organizations.

War time propaganda was distributed through films, newsreels, magazines and newspapers, radio, books, cartoons and the education system. In this paper we analyze only the actions of propaganda directed outwards, and not those of patriotic propaganda directed to encourage its population. Since much of the essay is devoted to the war propaganda, there are some actions and some media, such as posters or film, which are not mentioned in this work, as they are subject to censorship by the authorities, and lost access to most foreign markets during the war, and thus of no effect within of international relations.

2. The Ems Despatch: how propaganda helps establishing an Empire

The Ems Dispatch incited France to declare the Franco-Prussian War in July 1870. The actual dispatch was an internal message from the Prussian King's vacationing site to Otto von Bismarck in Berlin, reporting demands made by the French ambassador; it was Bismarck's released statement to the press that became known as Ems Dispatch. The name referred to Bad Ems, a resort spa east of Koblenz on the Lahn river, then situated in Hesse-Nassau, a new possession of Prussia.

In early 1870, the German Prince Leopold, of the Roman Catholic cadet branch Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, had been offered the vacant Spanish throne. The government of French Emperor Napoleon III voiced concern over a possible Spanish alliance with the Protestant House of Hohenzollern that ruled the Kingdom of Prussia, protested against it, and hinted about a war. Following the protests by France, Leopold had withdrawn his acceptance in July 1870. This was already considered a diplomatic defeat for Prussia. The French were not yet satisfied with this and demanded further commitments, especially a guarantee by the Prussian king that no member of any branch of his Hohenzollern family would ever be a candidate for the Spanish throne.

On 13 July 1870, King Wilhelm I of Prussia, on his morning stroll in the Kurpark in Ems, was waylaid by Count Vincent Benedetti¹, the French ambassador to Prussia since 1864. Benedetti had been instructed by his superior, Foreign Minister Agénor, the Duc de Gramont, to present the French demand that the king should guarantee that he would never again permit the candidacy of a Hohenzollern prince to the Spanish throne. The meeting was informal and took place on the promenade of the Kursaal with the king's entourage at a discreet distance. Politely, and in a friendly manner², «with the courtesy that never failed him», the king refused to bind himself to any course of action into the indefinite future. After their exchange, «the two departed coolly»³.

From the meeting, the King's secretary Heinrich Abeken wrote an account, which was passed on to Otto von Bismarck in Berlin. Wilhelm described Benedetti as «very importunate». The King gave permission to Bismarck to release an account of the events.

Bismarck took it upon himself to edit the report, sharpening the language. He cut out Wilhelm's conciliatory phrases and emphasized the real issue. The French had made certain demands under threat of war; and Wilhelm had refused them. This

¹ Crankshaw, Edward. *Bismarck*. New York: The Viking Press, 1981, p. 267. ISBN 067016982X.

² Koch, H. W. *A History of Prussia*. New York: Dorset Press, 1987, p. 266 (originally published in 1978). ISBN 0880291583.

³ Howard, Michael. *The Franco-Prussian War*. New York: Dorset Press. 1990, p. 53 (originally published in 1961). ISBN 0880294329.

was no forgery; it was a clear statement of the facts⁴. Certainly the edit of the telegram, released on the evening of the same day (13 July) to the media and foreign embassies, gave the impression both that Benedetti was rather more demanding and that the King was exceedingly abrupt. It was designed to give the French the impression that King Wilhelm I had insulted Count Benedetti; likewise, the Germans interpreted the modified dispatch as the Count insulting the King.

The document released to the press in Berlin already appeared in the newspapers on the afternoon of 13 July. On the 14th, a national holiday in France, the content of the message into the public domain in Europe even as the military parade was held in the center of Paris. The news of the meeting with the ambassador immediately reached the public, who recognized in the words of the King malicious intent designed to humiliate France. The dispatch was interpreted by the government in Paris as a serious offense. The Minister Agenor, duc de Gramont reported to Émile Ollivier that the treatment by King William I in Benedetti was an insult that France would not tolerate⁵.

Bismarck, in order to accentuate even further the scope of the crisis and urge the French reaction, made public the documents that Benedetti had filed four years before the Germans with requests by Napoleon III in the territories of Belgium and Luxembourg in compensation French neutrality during the Austro-Prussian War, sending them to *The Times* of London⁶.

Bismarck had viewed the worsening relations with France with open satisfaction. If war had to come, now was as good a time as any. His editing, he assured his friends, «would have the effect of a red rag on the Gallic [French] bull»⁷. The edited telegram was to be presented henceforth as the cause of the war⁸.

⁴ Taylor, A. J. P. *Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman*. New York: Vintage Books, 1967, p. 121. ISBN 0394703871.

⁵ Badsey, Stephen. *The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003, p. 30. ISBN 9781841764214.

⁶ Herre, Franz. *Bismarck. Il grande conservatore*. Translated by Anna Martini Lichtner. Milano: Il Giornale Biblioteca storica, Mondadori (originally published in 1994), 2004, p. 243. ISBN 8771124883008.

⁷ Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, p. 55.

⁸ Taylor, *Bismarck, The Man and the Statesman*, p. 121.

France's mistaken attitude of her own position carried matters far beyond what was necessary, and France mobilized⁹. Following further improper translations and misinterpretations of the dispatch in the press, excited crowds in Paris demanded war, just as Bismarck had anticipated¹⁰. The Ems Dispatch had also rallied German national feeling. It was no longer Prussia alone; South German particularism was now cast aside¹¹.

Benedetti, the messenger for the Duc de Gramont's demands for pointless guarantees (the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen family had withdrawn Prince Leopold's candidature on 11 July 1870 with Wilhelm's «entire and unreserved approval»¹²), became an unseen bit-player; his own dispatches to Paris no longer mattered. In the legislative chamber, by an overwhelming majority, the votes for war credits were passed. France declared war on 19 July 1870¹³. Later, the Duc de Gramont attempted to throw the blame for the failures of French diplomacy on Benedetti. In his defence Count Benedetti published his version of the events in *Ma Mission en Prusse* (Paris, 1871).

Bismarck, principal author of the intrigue diplomat, was successful in causing the reaction and bring up the French attacked as Prussia and France as the main cause of the conflict. As a result of the declaration of war, the German states of the South (contrary to predictions French) - Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden - joined the North German Confederation against France.

Bismarck had also been successful in its project to isolate from the diplomatic point of view the French Empire: the Prussian Chancellor had heard so much away from France, the United Kingdom, as Russia, which also pledged to remain neutral in the conflict. Wanting to prevent the intervention of England, he levered on suspicion of the latter towards Paris, because of its expansion plans in Belgium. For mortgage neutrality Russian Tsar guaranteed diplomatic support on the issue of demilitarization

⁹ Koch, *A History of Prussia*, p. 267.

¹⁰ Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, p. 55.

¹¹ Koch, *A History of Prussia*, p. 267.

¹² Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, p. 53.

¹³ Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, p. 57.

of the Black Sea that followed the Russian defeat in the Crimean War of 1856¹⁴. This clause, however, would eventually be irrevocably deleted in the London Conference in February 1871, by which time the war between Prussia and France had reached an end point, and Bismarck had already secured the agreement of the preliminary peace treaty by the French.

Thus, the press was unleashed a war that will lead to the defeat of France at Sedan, the fall of the Second Empire and the creation of the German Reich. Napoleon III had always been afraid of the press, so as to have enacted some laws restricting the publication of newspapers and on the liability of directors, so that the 1st Prime Minister of Italy, Camillo Paolo Filippo Giulio Benso, Count of Cavour, was forced in 1851 to suppress *La maga ed il fischietto* (The sorceress and the whistle), following the stress of Napoleon III, which do not could suffer the caricatures of him were publishing this paper¹⁵.

3. First World War: the first large-scale and organized propagation of government abroad propaganda

The First World War was characterized by rigid censorship. The first large-scale and organized propagation of government propaganda was occasioned by the outbreak of war in 1914. In the war's initial stages, propaganda output was greatly increased by the British and German governments, to persuade their populace in the justness of their cause, to encourage voluntary recruitment, and above all to demonize the enemy.

At the start of the war, Emperor Wilhelm II expanded its unofficial propaganda machinery, establishing the Central Office for Foreign Services, which among other duties was tasked with propaganda distribution to neutral nations, persuading them to either side with Germany or to maintain their stance of neutrality. After the

¹⁴ Testa, Ludovico. *Bismarck e la Grande Germania*. Firenze: Giunti Editore, 2004, p. 75. ISBN 8809034635.

¹⁵ Marsili, Marco. *Libertà di pensiero. Genesi ed evoluzione della libertà di manifestazione del pensiero negli ordinamenti politici dal V secolo a.C.* Milano: Mimesis edizioni, 2011, p. 149. ISBN 9788857507460.

declaration of war, Britain immediately cut the undersea cables that connected Germany to the outside world, thereby cutting off a major propaganda outlet. The Germans relied instead on the powerful wireless Nauen Transmitter Station to broadcast pro-German news reports to the world.

British propaganda during World War I — called ‘an impressive exercise in improvisation’ — was hastily expanded at the beginning of the war and was rapidly brought under government control as the War Propaganda Bureau (Wellington House), under the overall leadership of journalist Charles Masterman. The Bureau began its propaganda campaign on 2 September 1914 when Masterman invited 25 leading British authors to Wellington House to discuss ways of best promoting Britain’s interests during the war.

After January 1916 the War Propaganda Bureau’s activities were subsumed under the office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In early 1918 it was decided that a senior government figure should take over responsibility for propaganda and on 4 March Lord Beaverbrook, owner of the *Daily Express* newspaper, was made Minister of Information. The British effort soon far surpassed the German in its quality and ability to sway the public mood both at home and abroad.

A variety of propaganda methods were used by the British during the war, with emphasis on the need for credibility¹⁶. Written forms of distributed propaganda included books, pamphlets, official publications, ministerial speeches or royal messages. They were targeted at influential individuals, such as journalists and politicians, rather than a mass audience¹⁷. Pamphlets were distributed to various foreign countries, primarily the United States: these pamphlets were academic in tone and factual in nature, distributed through unofficial channels. By June 1915, 2.5 million copies of propagandistic documents had been circulated by Wellington House

¹⁶ Sanders, Michael L. and Taylor, Philip M. *British propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918*. London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 143. ISBN 9780333292754.

¹⁷ Messinger, Gary S. *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992, pp. 75–79. ISBN 0719030145.

in various languages; eight months later, the figure was 7 million¹⁸. Pamphlet production was greatly reduced under the Ministry of Information, to approximately a tenth of previous production¹⁹. This was both a result in changing ideas of the most efficient methods of propaganda and a response to paper shortage.

British propagandists also sought to influence the foreign press, by providing it with information through the Neutral Press Committee and the Foreign Office. Special telegraph agencies were established in various European cities, including Bucharest, Bilbao and Amsterdam, in order to facilitate the spread of information²⁰.

To supplement this activity, Wellington House produced illustrated newspapers, similar to the *Illustrated London News*, and influenced by the German use of pictorial propaganda. Various language editions were distributed, including *America Latina* in Spanish, *O Espelho* in Portuguese, *Hesperia* in Greek and *Cheng Pao* in Chinese²¹.

One major propaganda avenue was the use of atrocity stories. These aimed to mobilise hatred of the German enemy by spreading details of their atrocities, real or alleged, and was used extensively by Britain, reaching a peak in 1915, with much of the atrocities related to Germany's invasion of Belgium²². One of the first significant publications to be produced by the Bureau was the Report on Alleged German Outrages, in early 1915. This pamphlet documented atrocities both actual and alleged committed by the German army against Belgian civilians. Other atrocity stories included the fate of the nurse Edith Cavell and the Sinking of the RMS

¹⁸ Sanders, Michael L. "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War". *The Historical Journal* (1975) 18 (1): 119–146. doi: 10.1017/S0018246X00008700, JSTOR 2638471. ISSN 0018-246X.

¹⁹ Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War", p. 142.

²⁰ Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War", pp. 134-135.

²¹ Sanders, "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War", pp. 134-135.

²² Wilson, T.W. "Lord Bryce's Investigation into Alleged German Atrocities in Belgium, 1914-1918". *Journal of Contemporary History* (1979) 14 (3): 369-383. ISSN 00220094, Moyer, Laurence V. *Victory Must Be Ours: Germany in the Great War 1914-1918*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1995, pp. 96-97. ISBN 0781803705.

Lusitania. These had a significant impact both in Britain and in America, making front-page headlines in major newspapers²³.

Edith Cavell was a nurse in Brussels who was involved in a network helping allied prisoners to escape. This was in violation of German military law, and as a result she was court-martialled for treason, and having been found guilty was executed in 1915. The story was reported, however, in a way that presented the event as the murder of an innocent houser of refugees²⁴. Following her death, the story was reproduced by Wellington House for many propaganda campaigns, both domestically and to the United States. Pamphlets and images depicted her execution as an act of German barbarity. Soon after this incident, the French shot two German nurses who aided German prisoners of war to escape. German propagandists chose not to use this as propaganda.

One of the most widely disseminated documents of atrocity propaganda during the war was the *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*, or *Bryce Report*, of May 1915. This report, based on 1,200 witness depositions, depicted the systematic murder and violation of Belgians by German soldiers during their invasion of Belgium, including details of rape and the slaughter of children. Published by a committee of lawyers and historians, headed by the respected former ambassador Lord Bryce, the Report had a significant impact both in Britain and in America, making front-page headlines in major newspapers. It was also translated into 30 languages for distribution into allied and neutral countries²⁵. Its impact in America was heightened by the fact that it was published soon after the sinking of the Lusitania. In response to the Bryce Report, Germany published its own atrocity

²³ Haste, Cate. *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War*. London, Allen Lane, 1977, pp. 93–95. ISBN 0713908173, Sanders and Taylor, *British propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918*, p. 143, Knightley, Phillip. *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 86. ISBN 9780801869518, Welch, David. “Fakes”. In Cull, Nicholas J., Culbert, David H. and Welch, David (eds.), *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003, pp. 123–124. ISBN 9781576078204.

²⁴ Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War*, pp. 89-90.

²⁵ Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War*, pp. 93–95, Knightley, *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Kosovo*, p. 86, Sanders and Taylor, *British propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918*, p. 143, Welch, “Fakes”, pp. 123–124.

counterpropaganda, in the form of the 'White Book' (*Die völkerrechtswidrige Führung des belgischen Volkskriegs*) which detailed atrocities committed by Belgian civilians against German soldiers. However, its impact was limited outside of a few German-language publications; indeed, some interpreted it as an admission of guilt²⁶.

Other publications referring to the violation of Belgian neutrality were subsequently distributed in neutral countries. For example, Wellington House disseminated a pamphlet entitled *Belgium and Germany: Texts and Documents* in 1915, which was written by the Belgian Foreign Minister Davignon and featured details of alleged atrocities²⁷.

Another telegram, after the Ems despatch, has played a key role in the history of Germany, this time causing the end of the Reich. This telegram, written by German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann, is a coded message sent to Mexico, proposing a military alliance against the United States. The obvious threats to the United States contained in the telegram inflamed American public opinion against Germany and helped convince Congress to declare war against Germany in 1917²⁸.

Between 1914 and the spring of 1917, the European nations engaged in a conflict that became known as World War I. While armies battled in Europe, the United States remained neutral. In 1916 Woodrow Wilson was elected President for a second term, largely because of the slogan «He kept us out of war». Events in early 1917 would change that hope.

In January of 1917, British cryptographers deciphered a telegram from German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann to the German Minister to Mexico, von Eckhardt, offering United States territory to Mexico in return for joining the German cause. To protect their intelligence from detection and to capitalize on growing anti-German sentiment in the United States, the British waited to present the telegram to

²⁶ Haste, *Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War*, p. 95, Horne, John and Kramer, Alan. *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial*. London: Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 238–241. ISBN 0300089759, Messinger, *British Propaganda and the State in the First World War*, p. 75, Sanders & Taylor, *British propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918*, pp. 144.

²⁷ Sanders and Taylor, *British propaganda during the First World War, 1914-1918*, p. 142.

²⁸ The Zimmermann Telegram [online]. College Park, MD: National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives' Digital Classroom Teaching With Documents Lesson Plan. Article citation: Alexander, Mary and Marilyn Childress. "The Zimmerman Telegram". *Social Education* (1981) 45, 4: 266. [Retrieved 16 Nov. 2014]. Available at <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/zimmermann/>.

President Wilson. Meanwhile, frustration over the effective British naval blockade caused Germany to break its pledge to limit submarine warfare. In response, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany in February.

On 24 February Britain released the Zimmerman telegram to Wilson, and news of the telegram was published widely in the American press on March 1. The telegram had such an impact on American opinion that, according to David Kahn, author of *The Codebreakers*, «No other single cryptanalysis has had such enormous consequences»²⁹. It is his opinion that «never before or since has so much turned upon the solution of a secret message». On 6 April 1917, the United States Congress formally declared war on Germany and its allies. The Zimmerman telegram clearly had helped draw the United States into the war and thus changed the course of history.

4. Nazi propaganda

After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, military officials such as Erich Ludendorff suggested that British propaganda had been instrumental in their defeat. Nazi leader Adolf Hitler came to echo this view, believing that it had been a primary cause of the collapse of morale and the revolts in the German home front and Navy in 1918.

Hitler devoted three chapters (chapter VI, 'War Propaganda', and XI, 'Propaganda and Organization') of his 1925/26 book *Mein Kampf*, itself a propaganda tool, to the study and practice of propaganda. He claimed to have learnt the value of propaganda as a World War I infantryman exposed to very effective British and ineffectual German propaganda³⁰. The argument that Germany lost the war largely because of British propaganda efforts, expounded at length in *Mein Kampf*, reflected then-common German nationalist claims. Although untrue – German propaganda during World War I was mostly more advanced than that of the

²⁹ Kahn, David. *The Codebreakers. The Story of Secret Writing*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. ISBN 0684831309.

³⁰ Welch, "Fakes", p. 10, see *Mein Kampf*, ch. VI.

British – it became the official truth of Nazi Germany thanks to its reception by Hitler³¹.

In April 1930, Hitler appointed Joseph Goebbels head of party propaganda. Goebbels, a former journalist and Nazi party officer in Berlin, soon proved his skills. Later, the Nazis adapted many British propaganda techniques during their time in power. Most propaganda in Germany was produced by the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. Goebbels was placed in charge of this ministry shortly after Hitler took power, on 13 March 1933. Goals were to establish external enemies (countries that allegedly inflicted the Treaty of Versailles on Germany - by territorial claims and ethnocentrism) and internal enemies, such as Jews, Romani, homosexuals, Bolsheviks and topics like degenerate art.

The pervasive use of propaganda by the the Nazi Party in the years leading up to and during Adolf Hitler's leadership of Germany (1933–1945), home and abroad, is largely responsible for the word 'propaganda' itself acquiring its present negative connotations³².

A major political and ideological cornerstone of Nazi policy was the unification of all ethnic Germans living outside of the Reich's borders under one Greater Germany (e.g. Austria and Czechoslovakia)³³. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler made a direct remark to those outside of Germany. He stated that pain and misery were being forced upon ethnic Germans outside of Germany, and that they dream of common fatherland. He finished by stating they needed to fight for one's nationality³⁴. Throughout *Mein Kampf*, he pushed Germans worldwide to make the struggle for political power and independence their main focus. Nazi propaganda used the 'Heim ins Reich' policy for this, which began in 1938³⁵.

For months prior to the beginning of World War II in 1939, German newspapers and leaders had carried out a national and

³¹ Welch, "Fakes", p. 11.

³² Welch, "Fakes", p. 6.

³³ Merkl, Peter H. *German Unification in the European Context*. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2010, p. 35. ISBN 9780271044095.

³⁴ Hitler, Adolf. *Mein Kampf*. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1999 (originally published in 1925). ISBN 0395925037.

³⁵ Carter, Erica. *Dietrich's ghosts: the sublime and the beautiful in Third Reich film*. London: British Film Institute, 2004, p. 164. ISBN 9780851708829.

international propagandacampaign accusing Polish authorities of organizing or tolerating violent ethnic cleansing of ethnic Germans living in Poland³⁶. On 22 August, Adolf Hitler told his generals: «I will provide a propagandistic casus belli. Its credibility doesn't matter. The victor will not be asked whether he told the truth»³⁷. The main part of this propaganda campaign was the false flag project, Operation Himmler, which was designed to create the appearance of Polish aggression against Germany, which was subsequently used to justify the invasion of Poland³⁸.

Nazi government used as well propaganda in internal policy to argument and push anti-semitism, euthanasia, anti-semitic Nuremberg laws, and the national humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, as well as in foreign policy.

5. Second World War

The biggest war in history was also the one who had the most coverage. In fact there were about 3,000 journalists who followed the military operations on various fronts, but it is a small part of the many journalists who dealt with the conflict within the editorial. Although the largest medium of communication were the newspapers, had great importance as well as other media such as radio, which began its spread in the twenties, propaganda films and newsreels, often shown before the film shows. Print runs of newspapers increased strongly and articles by most famous envoys were eaten by millions of readers.

³⁶ "German newspaper editor outlining the claims of Polish atrocities against minorities" [online]. The Nizkor Project, 1991-2012. Last modified: 17 January 1997. [Retrieved 7 Nov. 2014]. Available at <http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/imt/nca/ftp.py?imt/nca/nca-06/nca-06-3469-ps-04>.

³⁷ Lightbody, Bradley. *The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis*. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2004, p. 39. ISBN 9780203644584, Godson, Roy and Wirtz, James J. *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*. Transaction Publishers, 2011, p. 100. ISBN 978-1-4128-3520-6.

³⁸ Lightbody, Bradley. *The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis*, p. 39, Manvell, Roger and Fraenkel, Heinrich. *Heinrich Himmler: The Sinister Life of the Head of the SS and Gestapo*. London: Greenhill Books, 2007, p. 76. ISBN 9781602391789, Godson and Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge*, p. 100.

5.1 Germany

Germany created a powerful system of manipulation of public opinion and propaganda, led by Joseph Goebbels, communications expert and fanatically loyal to Hitler. Goebbels had at his disposal a number of impressive graphics, journalists, photographers and film producers to control the morale of the troops and the people. The fact that more was kept secret was the Holocaust, the extermination of the Jews.

After Hitler's rise to power in 1933, all of the regular press came under complete Nazi editorial control through the policy of *Gleichschaltung*, and short-lived propaganda newspapers were also established in the conquered territories during World War II. Alfred Rosenberg was a key member of the Nazi party who gained control of their newspaper which was openly praised by Hitler. However, Hitler was dissatisfied by Rosenberg's work and slandered Rosenberg behind his back, discrediting his work³⁹.

In Ukraine, after Nazis cracked down on the papers, most papers printed only articles from German agencies, producing the odd effect of more anti-American and anti-British articles than anti-Communist ones⁴⁰. They also printed articles about antecedents of German rule over Ukraine, such as Catherine the Great and the Goths⁴¹.

In occupied France, the German Institute encouraged translation of German works, although chiefly German nationalists, not ardent Nazis, and produced a massive increase in the sale of translated works⁴². The only books from English to be sold were English classics, and books with Jewish authors or Jewish subject matter (such as biographies) were banned, except for some scientific works⁴³. Control of the

³⁹ Herzstein, Robert Edwin. *The Nazis*. Fairfax, VA: Time-Life Books, 1980. ISBN 1844471934.

⁴⁰ Berkhoff, Karel Cornelis. *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. ISBN 9780674013131.

⁴¹ Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule*.

⁴² Wolin, Richard. *The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance With Fascism: From Nietzsche to Postmodernism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 125. ISBN 9780691114644.

⁴³ "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 7: fifty-first day, Tuesday, 5 February 1946" [online]. New Haven, CT: The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library avalon.law.yale.edu, 2008. [Retrieved 6 Nov. 2014]. Available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/02-05-46.asp>.

paper supply allowed Germans the easy ability to pressure publishers about books⁴⁴. The Nazi-controlled government in German-occupied France produced the *Vica* comic book series during World War II as a propaganda tool against the Allied forces. The *Vica* series, authored by Vincent Krassousky, represented Nazi influence and perspective in French society, and included such titles as *Vica contre le service secret anglais*, and *Vica défie l'Oncle Sam*⁴⁵.

During the World War II Wehrmacht published *Signal*, a propaganda magazine⁴⁶. It was distributed throughout occupied Europe and neutral countries. *Signal* was published from April 1940 to March 1945, and had the highest sales of any magazine published in Europe during the period 1940 to 1945 (circulation peaked at two and one half million in 1943). At various times, it was published in at least twenty languages. There was an English edition distributed in the British Channel Islands of Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney, and Sark (these islands were occupied by the Wehrmacht during World War II).

The promoter of the magazine was the chief of the Wehrmacht propaganda office, Colonel Hasso von Wedel. Its annual budget was 10 million Reichmarks, roughly \$2.5 million at the pre-war exchange rate.

The image that *Signal* transmitted was that of Nazi Germany and its New Order as the great benefactor of European peoples and of Western civilization in general. The danger of a Soviet invasion of Europe was strongly pointed out. The quality of the magazine itself was quite high, featuring complete reviews from the front lines rich in information and photos, even displaying a double center page full colour picture. In fact, many of the most famous Second World War photos that are to be seen today come from *Signal*. The magazine contained little of none anti-Semitic propaganda, as the contents were mainly military⁴⁷.

⁴⁴ "Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 7: fifty-first day, Tuesday, 5 February 1946".

⁴⁵ "Vica Nazi Propaganda Comics" [online]. Durham, NC: Duke University Libraries Digital Collections, Library.duke.edu. [Retrieved 6 Nov. 2014]. Available at <http://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/vica/>.

⁴⁶ "Signal: A Nazi Propaganda Magazine" [online]. Randall Bytwerk, bytwerk.com, 2007. [Retrieved 6 Nov. 2014]. Available at <http://bytwerk.com/gpa/signal.htm>.

⁴⁷ Meyer, S.L. *Signal: Hitler's Wartime Picture Magazine*. 1st US edition. London: Bison Publishing Co., 1976, Introduction, pp. 1-2. ISBN 0600345017.

As well as domestic broadcasts, the Nazi regime also used radio to deliver its message to both occupied territories and enemy states. One of the main targets was the United Kingdom to which William Joyce broadcast regularly, gaining the nickname 'Lord Haw-Haw' in the process. Joyce first appeared on German radio on 6 September 1939 reading the news in English but soon became noted for his often mischievous propaganda broadcasts⁴⁸. Joyce was executed in 1946 for treason. Although the most notorious, and most regularly heard, of the UK propagandists, Joyce was not the only broadcaster, with others such as Norman Baillie-Stewart, Jersey-born teacher Pearl Vardon, British Union of Fascists members Leonard Banning and Susan Hilton, Barry Payne Jones of the Link and Alexander Fraser Grant, whose show was aimed specifically at Scotland, also broadcasting through the New British Broadcasting Service⁴⁹.

Broadcasts were also made to the United States, notably through Robert Henry Best and 'Axis Sally' Mildred Gillars. Best, a freelance journalist based in Vienna, was initially arrested following the German declaration of war on the US but before long he became a feature on propaganda radio, attacking the influence of the Jews in the US and the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who succeeded Winston Churchill in Nazi propaganda as «World-Enemy Number One»⁵⁰. Best would later be sentenced to life imprisonment for treason. Gillars, a teacher in Germany, mostly broadcast on similar themes as well as peppering her speech with allegations of infidelity against the wives of servicemen. Her most notorious broadcast was the 'Vision of Invasion' radio play, broadcast immediately prior to D-Day, from the perspective of an American mother who dreamed that her soldier son died violently in Normandy⁵¹.

⁴⁸ Kenny, Mary. *Germany Calling: A Personal Biography of William Joyce, Lord Haw Haw*. Dublin: New Island, 2003, p. 175. ISBN 1904301592.

⁴⁹ Murphy, Sean. *Letting the Side Down: British Traitors of the Second World War*. Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2006, pp. 50-102. ISBN 0750929367.

⁵⁰ Smith, Howard K. *Last Train from Berlin*. New York: Knopf, 1942, p. 207.

⁵¹ Edwards, John Carver. *Berlin Calling: American Broadcasters in Service to the Third Reich*. New York: Praeger, 1991. ISBN 0275939057.

France also received broadcasts from Radio-Stuttgart, where Paul Ferdonnet, an anti-Semitic journalist, was the main voice during the Phoney War⁵². Following the occupation, Radio Paris and Radio Vichy became the main organs of propaganda, with leading far right figures such as Jacques Doriot, Philippe Henriot and Jean Hérold-Paquis regularly speaking in support of the Nazis. Others who broadcast included Gerald Hewitt, a British citizen who lived most of his life in Paris and had been associated with Action Française⁵³. The use of domestic broadcasters intended to galvanise support for occupation was also used in Belgium, where Ward Hermans regularly spoke in support of the Nazis from his base in Bremen⁵⁴, and the Italian Social Republic, to where Giovanni Preziosi broadcast a vehemently anti-Semitic show from his base in Munich⁵⁵. Pro-Nazi radio broadcasts in the Arabic language aired in North Africa, crafted with the help of Mohammad Amin al-Husayni and other Arab exiles in Berlin to highlight Arab nationalism. They recast Nazi racist ideology to target Jews alone, not all Semites. Downplaying Benito Mussolini's operations in Africa, they touted the anti-colonialism of the Axis powers⁵⁶.

5.2 Italy

In Italy, the Fascist propaganda was directed primarily within the country. With the spread of ownership of radio units during the Fascist regime, radio became the major tool for propagandizing the population⁵⁷. It was used to broadcast Mussolini's open-air speeches, and as an instrument for propagandizing youth⁵⁸. American

⁵² Randa, Philippe. *Dictionnaire commenté de la Collaboration française*. Paris: J. Picollec Éditeur, 1997. ISBN 2864771659.

⁵³ Murphy, *Letting the Side Down*, pp. 85-87.

⁵⁴ Littlejohn, David. *The Patriotic Traitors*. London: Heinemann, 1972, p. 155. ISBN 043442725X.

⁵⁵ Moseley, Ray. *Mussolini: The Last 600 days of Il Duce*. Dallas, TX: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2004, p. 118. ISBN 9781589790957.

⁵⁶ Herf, Jeffrey. *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009. ISBN 9780300145793.

⁵⁷ Brendon, Piers. *The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s*. New York: Vintage, 2000, p. 554. ISBN 0375408819.

⁵⁸ Rhodes, Anthony. *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1976, p. 80-81. ISBN 0877540292.

author Ezra Pound broadcast on short-wave radio to propagandize the United States⁵⁹.

5.3 Great Britain

The situation in Britain and the United States was somewhat different. In England, the reasons for the war were justified by the fact that Hitler wanted to conquer the world. Britain re-created the World War I Ministry of Information on 4 September 1939, the day after Britain's declaration of war, to generate propaganda to influence the population towards support for the war effort. It was the Ministry's function to «present the national case to the public at home and abroad»⁶⁰.

The sinking of the SS Athenia, killing civilians including Americans, on the first day of the war was widely exploited as demonstrating that the U-boat was the same instrument of terror as in World War I; the Germans attempted to counter it by claiming the British had sunk the ship themselves to blacken Germany⁶¹.

Leaflets were widely used for propagandizing enemy-held territory, by dropping them from aeroplanes⁶². As early as the Phoney War, pamphlets were being dropped⁶³. On the anniversary of Hitler's premature declaration of victory against the Soviet Union, in 1941, copies of the *Völkischer Beobachter* reporting the story were dropped on Germany⁶⁴. One Italian one invoked Garibaldi, who had said that Italy's future was linked with Great Britain's, declaring the bombings the 'curse of Garibaldi'⁶⁵. Italy's entrance to the war was derided for their having waited until victory looked secure, but the anti-Italian feeling never reached the pitch of anti-German sentiment⁶⁶. A few weeks after D-Day, crates of books were landed in Normandy, to be distributed to French booksellers; an equal number of American and

⁵⁹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 88.

⁶⁰ McLaine, Ian. *Ministry of Morale*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979, p. 12. ISBN 004940055X.

⁶¹ Williams, Andrew. *The Battle of the Atlantic: Hitler's Gray Wolves of the Sea and the Allies' Desperate Struggle to Defeat Them*. New York: Basic Books, 2003. p. 17. ISBN 0465091539.

⁶² Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 110.

⁶³ Briggs, Susan. *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939–1945*. New York: American Heritage Pub. Co., 1975, p. 40.

⁶⁴ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 112.

⁶⁵ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 87.

⁶⁶ Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939–1945*, p. 136.

British efforts were included⁶⁷. British propaganda was circulated in occupied countries through the efforts of the underground movements⁶⁸.

Prior to the German attack on the Soviet Union, the USSR was treated with hostility, such as when a paper explained that Tchaikovsky was a product of Tsarist, not Bolshevik, Russia. This treatment became more favourable after Germany's attack⁶⁹. The British Ministry of Information put out a booklet on countering ideological fears of Bolshevism, including claims that the Red Terror was a figment of Nazi imagination. This inspired George Orwell to leave the BBC and write *Animal Farm*, which was suppressed by the Ministry until the end of the war⁷⁰. Until long after the war, the British supported the Soviet claim that the Nazis had staged the Katyn Massacre⁷¹. The Battle of Stalingrad received particular attention as a great victory⁷².

Radio was widely used, with broadcasts in 23 languages; it proved to be rather simpler to the occupied countries than to Germany itself⁷³. Transmitters in England would also pose as broadcasting from Germany, where mostly factual reports would be studded with lies⁷⁴. British victories were announced to the public for morale purposes, and broadcast to Germany for purposes of undermining morale. When the U-boat commander Günther Prien vanished with his submarine U-47, Churchill personally informed the House of Commons, and radio broadcasts to Germany asked, «Where is Prien?» until Germany was forced to acknowledge his loss⁷⁵.

The instant—and unauthorised—rejection of the peace terms of Hitler's on 19 July 1940, speech by Sefton Delmer on the BBC produced a great impact on

⁶⁷ Hench, John B. *Books As Weapons*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010, p. 1. ISBN 9780801448911.

⁶⁸ Hench, *Books As Weapons*, p. 29.

⁶⁹ Briggs, *The Home Front: War Years in Britain, 1939–1945*, p. 200.

⁷⁰ Overy, Richard. *Why the Allies Won*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996, p. 297. ISBN 0393039250.

⁷¹ Roberts, Andrew. *The Storm of War*. New York: Harper, 2011, p. 25. ISBN 9780061228599.

⁷² Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, pp. 84-85.

⁷³ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 111.

⁷⁴ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 112.

⁷⁵ Williams, Andrew. *The Battle of the Atlantic: Hitler's Gray Wolves of the Sea and the Allies' Desperate Struggle to Defeat Them*, pp. 124-126.

Germany; Goebbels believed it had to show governmental inspiration, and while propaganda efforts were made to talk the British around, the German press were instructed to attack the rejection⁷⁶. The speed of the rejection unquestionably led the great impact, which authorisation would have prevented; this produced consternation in the government, as the effect was desirable, but they did not know whether such a spokesman would again happen to say what the government wanted⁷⁷.

The British Security Coordination was created to propagandise the United States to enter the war, and presented massive amounts of propaganda which they successfully concealed as news reports, not one of them having been 'rumbled' as a propaganda piece during the war.

5.4 United States

In the United States there was a cover-neutral and true to the entrance into the war, then it was set up a real body of information control and manipulation of public opinion. Each photo or article to exceed the control of a dedicated center of propaganda and censorship before publication.

Leaflets could be dropped from aircraft to populations in locations unreachable by other means; for example, when the population was afraid or unable to listen to foreign radio broadcasts. As such, the United States extensively used leaflets to convey short informational tidbits. In fact, one squadron of B-17 bombers was entirely dedicated to this purpose⁷⁸. Leaflets were also used against enemy forces, providing «safe conduct passes» that enemy troops could use to surrender as well as counterfeit ration books, stamps and currency⁷⁹. The very scale of the leaflet operations had its effect on enemy morale, showing that the Allied armament industry was so productive that planes could be diverted for this purpose⁸⁰.

⁷⁶ Balfour, Michael. *Propaganda in War 1939–1945: Organisation, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*. London: Routledge, 1979, p. 195–196. ISBN 0710001932.

⁷⁷ Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939–1945: Organisation, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*, p. 195.

⁷⁸ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 146.

⁷⁹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, pp. 146-147.

⁸⁰ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 147.

The use of leaflets against Japanese troops was of little effect⁸¹. Many civilians in Okinawa discounted pamphlets declaring that prisoners would not be harmed⁸². By the time American planes could reach the Japanese home islands, the leaflets had improved, providing 'advance notice' of bombings ensured that the leaflets were read avidly despite prohibitions⁸³. These pamphlets declared they had no wish to harm civilians, only the military installations, and that the bombings could be stopped by demanding new leaders who would end the war⁸⁴. After the atomic attacks, more pamphlets were dropped, warning that the Americans had an even more powerful explosive at their disposal⁸⁵. When the Japanese government subsequently offered to surrender, the US continued to drop pamphlets, telling the Japanese people of their government's offer and that they had a right to know the terms⁸⁶.

In the United States, radio was so widely used for propaganda that it greatly exceeded the use of other media that was typically used against other nations⁸⁷. President Roosevelt's fireside chats are an excellent example of this use of radio⁸⁸. In February 1942, Norman Corwin's «This is War» series was broadcast throughout the country and, by shortwave, throughout the world⁸⁹. Other significant uses of radio overseas includes messages to the Italian Navy, which persuaded it to surrender⁹⁰. CBS Radio's counterpropaganda series «Our Secret Weapon» (1942–43), featuring writer Rex Stout representing Freedom House, monitored Axis shortwave radio propaganda broadcasts and rebutted the most entertaining lies of the week⁹¹.

⁸¹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 262.

⁸² Toland, John. *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945*. New York: Random House, 1970, p. 724.

⁸³ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 262.

⁸⁴ Hastings, Max. *Retribution: The Battle for Japan 1944-45*. 1st US edition. New York: Knopf, 2008, p. 313 (originally published in 1944). ISBN 9780307263513.

⁸⁵ Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945*, p. 724.

⁸⁶ Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945*, p. 829.

⁸⁷ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, pp. 147-148.

⁸⁸ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 148.

⁸⁹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, pp. 148-149.

⁹⁰ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 150.

⁹¹ Dunning, John. *On the Air: The Encyclopedia of Old-Time Radio*. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1998, p. 529. ISBN 9780195076783 Revised edition of *Tune In Yesterday* (1976).

At first the Japanese population could not receive propaganda by radio because short-wave receivers were prohibited in Japan. However, the capture of Saipan, in the Mariana Islands, on 9 July 1944 not only shocked the Japanese because it was considered invincible, but allowed Americans to use medium-wave radio to reach the Japanese islands⁹².

Also books had a role in the American propaganda during WWII. A few weeks after D-Day, crates of books were landed in Normandy to be distributed to French booksellers. An equal number of American and British efforts were included in these shipments⁹³. Books had been stockpiled for this purpose, and some books were specifically published for it⁹⁴.

American propaganda was circulated in occupied countries through the efforts of the underground movements⁹⁵. Stockpiled books were shipped to France within weeks of D-Day, in order to counteract Nazi propaganda, particularly anti-American propaganda⁹⁶. This was part of 'consolidation propaganda', intended to pacify occupied regions so as to limit the forces needed to occupy; to counter-act Nazi propaganda, particularly about the United States; and to explain what the United States had done during the war⁹⁷.

5.5 Japan

Also Japan set up its propaganda during the Second World War. Short wave radios were used to broadcast anti-European propaganda to Southeast Asia even before the war⁹⁸. Japan, fearful of foreign propaganda, had banned such receivers for Japanese, but built broadcasters for all the occupied countries to extol the benefits of Japanese rule and attack Europeans⁹⁹. 'Singing towers' or 'singing trees' had

⁹² Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 259.

⁹³ Hensch, *Books As Weapons*, p. 1.

⁹⁴ Hensch, *Books As Weapons*, p. 6.

⁹⁵ Hensch, *Books As Weapons*, p. 29.

⁹⁶ Hensch, *Books As Weapons*, pp. 6-7.

⁹⁷ Hensch, *Books As Weapons*, p. 69.

⁹⁸ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 249.

⁹⁹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 255.

loudspeakers on them to spread the broadcasts¹⁰⁰. Broadcasts and leaflets urged India to revolt against British rule now that Great Britain was distracted¹⁰¹. Other leaflets and posters, aimed at Allied forces of different nationalities, attempted to drive a wedge between them by attacking other Allied countries. Tokyo Rose's broadcasts¹⁰² were aimed at American troops¹⁰³.

Propaganda declared that the war had been forced on them in self-defense. As early as the Manchurian Incident, the mass media uncritically spread the report that the Chinese had caused the explosion, attacking Japan's rights and interests, and therefore the Japanese must defend their rights, even at great sacrifice¹⁰⁴. This argument was made even to the League of Nations: they were only trying to prevent anti-Japanese activities by the Guomindang¹⁰⁵.

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, newspapers reported that unless negotiations improved, Japan would be forced to engage in self-defense measures¹⁰⁶. Indeed, after the attack, propaganda to American forces operated on the assumption that Americans would regard Pearl Harbor as a defensive act, forced on them by «Roosevelt and his clique»¹⁰⁷.

The United States and Great Britain were attacked years before the war, with any Western idea conflicting with Japanese practice being labeled «dangerous thoughts»¹⁰⁸. They were attacked as materialistic and soulless, both in Japan and in short-wave broadcasts to Southeast Asia¹⁰⁹. Not only were such thoughts censored through strict control of publishing, the government used various popular organizations to foment hostility to them¹¹⁰. Great Britain was attacked with particular

¹⁰⁰ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, pp. 255-256.

¹⁰¹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 256.

¹⁰² Tokyo Rose was a generic name given by Allied troops in the South Pacific during World War II to what they believed were multiple English-speaking female broadcasters of Japanese propaganda.

¹⁰³ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 256.

¹⁰⁴ McClain, James L. *Japan: A Modern History*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002, p. 410. ISBN 0393041565.

¹⁰⁵ McClain, *Japan: A Modern History*, p. 450.

¹⁰⁶ Hoyt, Edwin P. *Japan's War*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986, p. 219. ISBN 0070306125.

¹⁰⁷ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 257.

¹⁰⁸ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 249.

¹⁰⁹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 249.

¹¹⁰ Beasley, William G. *The Rise of Modern Japan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, p. 185. ISBN 0312040776.

fervor owing to its many colonies, and blamed for the continued stalemate in China¹¹¹. Chiang Kai-shek was denounced as a Western puppet¹¹², supplied through British and American exploitation of Southeast Asian colonies¹¹³. Militarists, hating the arms control treaties that allowed Japan only 3 ships for British and American 5, used «5-5-3» as a nationalistic slogan¹¹⁴. Furthermore, they wished to escape an international capitalist system dominated by British and American interests¹¹⁵.

In an effort to exacerbate racial tensions in the United States, the Japanese enacted what was titled, «Negro Propaganda Operations»¹¹⁶. This plan, created by Yasuichi Hikida, the director of Japanese propaganda for Black Americans, consisted of three areas¹¹⁷. First was gathering information pertaining to Black Americans and their struggles in America, second was the use of Black prisoners of war in the propaganda, and third was the use of short-wave radio broadcasts¹¹⁸. Through shortwave radio broadcasts, Japanese used their own radio announcers and African American POWs to spread propaganda to the United States. Broadcasts focused on US news stories involving racial tension, such as the Detroit Race riots and lynchings¹¹⁹. For example, one broadcast commented, «notorious lynchings are a rare practice even among the most savage specimens of the human race»¹²⁰. In an effort to gain more listeners, POWs would be allowed to address family members back home¹²¹. The Japanese believed propaganda would be the most effective if

¹¹¹ Brendon, *The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s*, p. 639.

¹¹² McClain, *Japan: A Modern History*, p. 451.

¹¹³ McClain, *Japan: A Modern History*, p. 471.

¹¹⁴ O'Neill, William L. *A Democracy At War: America's Fight At Home and Abroad in World War II*. New York: Free Press, 1993, p 52. ISBN 0029236789.

¹¹⁵ McClain, L. *Japan: A Modern History*, p. 460.

¹¹⁶ Masaharu, Sato and Kushner, Barak. "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans". *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* (March 1999) 19 (1): 5-26. doi: 10.1080/014396899100334.

¹¹⁷ Masaharu and Kushner, "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans".

¹¹⁸ Masaharu and Kushner, "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans".

¹¹⁹ Menefee, Selden C. "Japan's psychological war". *Social Forces* (May 1943) 21 (4): 425-436. doi: 10.2307/ 2571175, Padover, Saul K. "Japanese race propaganda". *The Public Opinion Quarterly* (1943 Summer) 7 (2): 191-204. doi: 10.1086/265613.

¹²⁰ Masaharu and Kushner, "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans".

¹²¹ Menefee, "Japan's psychological war".

they used African American POWs to communicate to African Americans back home. Using programs titled «Conversations about Real Black POW Experiences» and «Humanity Calls», POWs would speak on the conditions of war, and their treatment in the military. POWs with artistic strengths were used in plays and or songs that were broadcast back home¹²². The success of this propaganda is much debated, as only a small minority of people in America had shortwave radios¹²³. Even so, some scholars believe that the Negro Propaganda Operations, «evoked a variety of responses within the Black community and the sum total of these reactions forced America's government to improve conditions for Blacks in the military and society»¹²⁴. Even the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) saw the propaganda as, «...[omissis] a media tool in the struggle against racial discrimination»¹²⁵. Despite these debates both sides agree that these programs were particularly dangerous because of their foundation in truth¹²⁶.

Leaflets in China asked why they were not better defended after all the money they had spent¹²⁷. Leaflets were dropped by airplane on the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, urging them to surrender as the Japanese would be better than the Europeans¹²⁸. They were also dropped in India to encourage a revolt against British rule now that Great Britain was distracted¹²⁹.

Pamphlets were dropped by airplane on the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, urging them to join a new order to ensure the stability of East Asia¹³⁰. Mutual cultural societies were founded in all conquered nations to ingratiate

¹²² Masaharu and Kushner, "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans".

¹²³ Menefee, "Japan's psychological war".

¹²⁴ Masaharu and Kushner, "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans".

¹²⁵ Masaharu and Kushner, "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans".

¹²⁶ Masaharu and Kushner, "Negro propaganda operations': Japan's Short-Wave Radio Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans", Menefee, "Japan's psychological war", Padover, "Japanese race propaganda".

¹²⁷ Harries, Meirion and Harries, Susie. *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*. New York: Random House, 1991, p. 239. ISBN 0394569350.

¹²⁸ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 253.

¹²⁹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 256.

¹³⁰ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 253.

with the natives and try to supplant English with Japanese as the commonly used language¹³¹. Multi-lingual pamphlets depicted many Asians marching or working together in happy unity, with the flags of all the nations and a map depicting the intended sphere. Others proclaimed that they had given independent governments to the countries they occupied, a claim undermined by the lack of power given these puppet governments.

5.6 USSR

According to historian Peter Kenez, «the Russian socialists have contributed nothing to the theoretical discussion of the techniques of mass persuasion. ... The Bolsheviks never looked for and did not find devilishly clever methods to influence people's minds, to brainwash them». This lack of interest, says Kenez, «followed from their notion of propaganda. They thought of propaganda as part of education»¹³².

In 1919 Lenin founded The Communist International, abbreviated as Comintern and also known as the Third International, to propagate Communism internationally¹³³. Stalin proceeded to use it to promote Communism throughout the world for the benefit of the USSR¹³⁴. When this topic was a difficulty dealing with the Allies in World War II, Comintern was dissolved in 1943¹³⁵. Similarly, The Internationale was dropped as the anthem¹³⁶.

In the 1920s, much Soviet propaganda for the outside world was aimed at capitalist countries as plutocracies, and claiming that they intended to destroy the

¹³¹ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 254.

¹³² Kenez, Peter. *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 8. ISBN 0521306361.

¹³³ Service, Robert. *A History of Modern Russia, from Nicholas II to Putin*. Harvard University Press, revised edition 2005 (originally published in 1998), p. 270. ISBN 067401801X.

¹³⁴ Harries and Harries, *Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army*, pp. 139-140.

¹³⁵ Service, *A History of Modern Russia, from Nicholas II to Putin*, p. 270.

¹³⁶ Service, *A History of Modern Russia, from Nicholas II to Putin*, p. 282.

Soviet Union as the workers' paradise¹³⁷. Capitalism, being responsible for the ills of the world, therefore was fundamentally immoral¹³⁸.

Fascism was presented as a terroristic outburst of finance capital, and drawing from the *petit bourgeoisie*, and the middling peasants, equivalent to kulaks, who were the losers in the historical process¹³⁹. Anti-fascism was commonly used in propaganda aimed outside the USSR during the 1930s, particularly to draw people into front organizations¹⁴⁰. The Spanish Civil War was, in particular, used to quash dissent among European Communist parties and reports of Stalin's growing totalitarianism¹⁴¹.

From 1930 to 1941, as well as briefly in 1949, the propaganda journal *USSR in Construction* was circulated. It was published in Russian, French, English, German, and, from 1938, Spanish. The self-proclaimed purpose of the magazine was to «reflect in photography the whole scope and variety of the construction work now going on the USSR»¹⁴². The issues were aimed primarily at an international audience, especially western left wing intellectuals and businessmen, and were quite popular during its early publications, including George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, John Galsworthy, and Romain Rolland among its subscribers¹⁴³.

During World War II, radio was used to propagandize Germany; German POWs would be brought on to speak and assure their relatives they were alive, with propaganda being inserted between the announcement that a soldier would speak and when he actually did, in the time allowed for his family to gather and listen, and

¹³⁷ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 216.

¹³⁸ Overy, Richard. *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004, p. 299. ISBN 0393020304.

¹³⁹ Bosworth, R. J. B. *Mussolini's Italy: Life Under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915-1945*. New York, NY: Penguin Press HC, 2006, p. 134. ISBN 1594200785.

¹⁴⁰ Riding, Alan. *And the Show Went On: Cultural Life in Nazi-Occupied Paris*. New York: Knopf, 2010, p. 22. ISBN 9780307268976.

¹⁴¹ Riding, *And the Show Went On: Cultural Life in Nazi-Occupied Paris*, p. 24.

¹⁴² *URSS in Construction* [online]. Saskatoon, Canada: University of Saskatchewan. [Retrieved 8 Nov. 2014]. Available at <http://library2.usask.ca/USSRConst/about>.

¹⁴³ *URSS in Construction*.

fill it with propaganda.¹⁴⁴ A National Committee for 'Free Germany' was founded in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps in an attempt to foment an uprising in Germany¹⁴⁵.

During the early stages of World War II, it was overtly presented as a war between capitalists, which would weaken them and allow Communist triumph as long as the Soviet Union wisely stayed out¹⁴⁶. Communist parties over the world were instructed to oppose the war as a clash between capitalist States¹⁴⁷. After World War II, the United States of America was presented as a bastion of imperial oppression, with which non-violent competition would take place, as capitalism was in its last stages¹⁴⁸.

Trotsky and a small group of Communists regarded the Soviet Union as doomed without the spread of Communism internationally¹⁴⁹. The victory of Stalin, who regarded the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union as a necessary exemplar to the rest of the world and represented the majority view¹⁵⁰, did not, however, stop international propaganda. Propaganda abroad was partly conducted by Soviet intelligence agencies. CIA estimated in 1980s that the budget of Soviet propaganda abroad was between 3.5-4.0 billion dollars¹⁵¹.

Soviet-run movements pretended to have little or no ties with the USSR, often seen as non communist (or allied to such groups), but in fact were controlled by USSR¹⁵². Most members and supporters, called 'useful idiots' did not realize the fact that they were unwilling instruments of Soviet propaganda¹⁵³. The organizations aimed at convincing well-meaning but naive Westerners to support Soviet overt or covert goals.¹⁵⁴ A witness in a US congressional hearing on Soviet cover activity

¹⁴⁴ Rhodes, *Propaganda: The art of persuasion: World War II*, p. 224.

¹⁴⁵ Balfour, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisation, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany*, p. 359.

¹⁴⁶ Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia*, p. 484.

¹⁴⁷ Weinberg, Gerhard L. *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 100. ISBN 0521852544.

¹⁴⁸ Service, *A History of Modern Russia, from Nicholas II to Putin*, p. 362.

¹⁴⁹ Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia*, pp. 25-26.

¹⁵⁰ Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia*, p. 38.

¹⁵¹ Staar, Richard Felix. *Foreign policies of the Soviet Union*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1991, p. 75. ISBN 0817991026.

¹⁵² Staar, *Foreign policies of the Soviet Union*, p. 79.

¹⁵³ Staar, *Foreign policies of the Soviet Union*, pp. 79, 84.

¹⁵⁴ Staar, *Foreign policies of the Soviet Union*, p. 86.

described the goals of such organizations as the: «spread Soviet propaganda themes and create false impression of public support for the foreign policies of Soviet Union». ¹⁵⁵ Those organizations received (total) more than 100 million dollars from USSR every year ¹⁵⁶.

6. Conclusions

Propaganda is a form of communication aimed towards influencing the attitude of a population or a government toward some cause or position. Propaganda is information that is not impartial and used primarily to influence an audience and further an agenda, often by presenting facts selectively (thus possibly lying by omission) to encourage a particular synthesis, or using loaded messages to produce an emotional rather than rational response to the information presented. Propaganda also has much in common with public information campaigns by governments, which are intended to encourage or discourage certain forms of behavior.

Propaganda is a powerful weapon in war; it is used to dehumanize and create hatred toward a supposed enemy, either internal or external, by creating a false image in the mind. This can be done by using derogatory or racist terms, avoiding some words or by making allegations of enemy atrocities. Most propaganda wars require the home population to feel the enemy has inflicted an injustice, which may be fictitious or may be based on facts. The home population must also decide that the cause of their nation is just.

Propaganda is also one of the methods used in psychological warfare, which may also involve false flag operations. The term propaganda may also refer to false information meant to reinforce the mindsets of people who already believe as the propagandist wishes. The assumption is that, if people believe something false, they will constantly be assailed by doubts. Since these doubts are unpleasant, people will be eager to have them extinguished, and are therefore receptive to the reassurances of those in power. For this reason *propaganda is often addressed to*

¹⁵⁵ Staar, Richard Felix. *Foreign policies of the Soviet Union* (1991), p. 84.

¹⁵⁶ Staar, Richard Felix. *Foreign policies of the Soviet Union* (1991), pp. 79, 84.

people who are already sympathetic to the agenda. This process of reinforcement uses an individual's predisposition to self-select 'agreeable' information sources as a mechanism for maintaining control.

Propaganda has become more common in political contexts, in particular to refer to certain efforts sponsored by governments, political groups, but also often covert interests. During the 20th century the term acquired a thoroughly negative meaning in western countries, representing the intentional dissemination of often false, but certainly 'compelling' claims to support or justify political actions or ideologies. This redefinition arose because both the Soviet Union and Germany's government under Hitler admitted explicitly to using propaganda favoring, respectively, communism and Nazism, in all forms of public expression. As these ideologies were repugnant to liberal western societies, the negative feelings toward them came to be projected into the word 'propaganda' itself. In post-World War II usage the word 'propaganda' more typically refers to political or nationalist uses of these techniques or to the promotion of a set of ideas, since the term had gained a pejorative meaning.

If we assume as true Clausewitz's famous saying, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means, we must consider propaganda as a political mean. Thus, in international relations, we must consider propaganda as a political instrument.

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